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2. Relative Autonomy
A Characterisation of the Discipline of Law
Sanne Taekema
1. Introduction
Interdisciplinarity does not make sense without the idea of disciplinarity. To say 
anything sensible about interdisciplinary research into law, it is therefore neces-
sary to have an idea of what the discipline of law is. The term ‘law’ itself is 
ambiguous, as it can refer not only to the social practice or domain of law but 
also to the refl ection upon that social practice taking place in research. When 
we speak of the discipline of law, it is the second sense of law that applies: the 
study of legal phenomena in an academic setting. In this chapter, I will sketch 
the contours of the discipline of law, and to avoid confusion I will speak of legal 
scholarship or legal research to refer to the activities taking place within the 
legal discipline. Law as a social domain or practice is then the subject matter of 
legal scholarship.1
The central question of this chapter concerns how to characterise legal schol-
arship as an academic discipline. My aim is not only to describe the distinctive 
characteristics that set legal scholarship apart from other academic disciplines 
but also to relate legal scholarship to other disciplines. My basic descriptive 
claim is that the specifi c character of legal scholarship has developed out of two 
sources – its relationship both to legal practice and to the humanities – but is 
now under strain primarily because of the growing importance of a social sci-
ence approach to law.
In the following, I will sketch three central characteristics of legal scholar-
ship: the orientation towards legal practice (Section 2); the internal perspective 
taken by legal scholars (Section 3); and the hermeneutical method used (Sec-
tion 4). Each of these central characteristics has recently been challenged or 
debated, so I will also address the recent discussions. I will conclude the chap-
1 What I call legal scholarship is sometimes also referred to as legal science. However, 
because the word ‘science’ in English has the connotation of empirical, natural science, I 
prefer the more neutral term ‘scholarship’.
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ter by relating legal scholarship to the relatively autonomous character of law as 
a practice.
2. First characteristic: Oriented towards professional practice
Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of legal scholarship is that it has always 
been wedded to the professional practice of law.2 This is, fi rst of all, a conse-
quence of the legal education provided at universities. Law schools, or faculties 
of law more generally, educate students for careers as lawyers, judges, and nota-
ries: in short, for specifi c legal professions. Law professors, therefore, need to 
provide the knowledge and teach the skills demanded by the professions. Not 
surprisingly, their research interests parallel their course topics. However, this is 
only part of the explanation, since the close relationship to the professions is 
broader than the unity of teaching and research. A second, more comprehensive 
explanation is that the audience for which legal research is written is the profes-
sional world in which legal scholars write to be read by practicing lawyers; this 
means that their criterion of relevance for their research is relevance to profes-
sional practice.3 This is reinforced by a third aspect: legal scholarship and the 
professions are often practiced by the same people. Legal scholars have previous 
careers as professional lawyers, or hold part-time positions as judges or attorneys; 
conversely, practicing lawyers write scholarly articles or work towards a PhD.4
What emerges from this close relationship between scholarship and practice 
is a specifi c type of research, which can be characterised as commentary on 
positive law.5 The starting points for research are the existing or proposed leg-
islation and the decisions by the highest courts, which form the core of the 
positive law. What scholars do is reconstruct the legal doctrine contained in 
these rules, meaning that they systematise the rules into a coherent whole and 
evaluate trends in legislation and adjudication in terms of the doctrine they have 
reconstructed. Henceforth, I will refer to this type of research as doctrinal re-
search.
2 In this chapter, I cannot avoid using the term ‘practice’ in two senses: as professional 
legal practice (the work of legal practitioners, lawyers, and judges) and as the broader domain 
of law as a part of society. For an explanation of the second sense, see the fi rst paragraph of 
Section 3.
3 Posner 2002, 1314.
4 In this chapter, I try to generalise the argument to cover both the European and Anglo-
American situation. There are, however, marked differences. For instance, in the United 
States there is a distinction between a general PhD and a specifi cally legal JD as forms of the 
doctorate. In Europe, a PhD is the general degree covering law as well.
5 Murphy/Roberts 1987, 677.
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Two features of doctrinal legal research merit further discussion: fi rst, the way 
that it is both descriptive and normative, and second, its practical orientation. 
First of all, doctrinal legal research combines descriptive and normative re-
search. The bulk of doctrinal research aims at giving an accurate description of 
the present state of positive law, where the added value of scholarly work is the 
systematic treatment of the subject and the accuracy of the doctrine as a restate-
ment of the legal subject in question. The scholarly work that refl ects this aspect 
of doctrinal research best is the treatise or handbook: the comprehensive state-
ment with regard to the fi eld, encompassing all the relevant statutes and cases. 
The success of a handbook can be measured according to the uses made of it in 
legal practice: the more authoritative it is, the more references to it in cases.
Much doctrinal legal research, however, does more than systematise the ex-
isting law: it also evaluates. This normative side of doctrinal research takes a 
number of different forms, ranging from a critical comment on a judicial deci-
sion to an explicit call for law reform. However, it is essential to realise that the 
normative work done by legal scholars arises out of their descriptive work. A 
good example is the annotation or case note. In many continental legal cultures, 
the commentary of a renowned scholar on an important case is a genre in itself; 
these commentaries can range from very brief characterisations of the decision 
in relation to existing doctrine to a systematic treatment of the development of 
case law in the fi eld. Many of these comments, or at least the most infl uential 
annotations, also evaluate the decision, either in terms of the basic principles of 
the doctrine or of its utility for legal practice. In a similar way, scholarly articles 
make normative comments on new (or proposed) legislation or case law, criti-
cising or praising the direction taken by the legal authorities. These normative 
conclusions can be said to arise out of the descriptive work, not because they 
appear naturally or magically from it, but because the groundwork for the nor-
mative statement has been laid by the descriptive research.
A description of the present state of law has value because it classifi es and 
systematises legal materials that are not necessarily well organised in themselves. 
Because these legal materials contain normative statements, meaning they pre-
scribe conduct, classifying them entails formulating the normative principles 
that underlie the fi eld in question. These principles in turn can form the basis of 
an evaluation of a particular piece of legislation or set of cases, because they can 
be judged as being in accordance or out of accordance with these principles. Of 
course, this is not the whole story about the basis for normative work. Never-
theless, it is a vital component, because it shows how closely connected descrip-
tion and evaluation can be.
Often, however, the normative position in doctrinal research is more clearly 
stated, and also more radical. This type of research advocates law reform: that is, 
36 Sanne Taekema
it criticises explicitly the present state of law and recommends specifi c changes. 
Recommended changes usually concern specifi c points of law, such as the adap-
tation of a statutory rule, but are sometimes as radical as the proposition to abol-
ish a whole fi eld of law.6 Although such research is not simply legal commentary, 
because its main goal is to suggest changes, it is usually a form of doctrinal re-
search in the sense that it arises out of the study of the doctrines and principles of 
the legal system under consideration, and recommends improvements in the le-
gal system to legal decision-makers.7 The basis for the recommendations is usu-
ally not elaborately theorised; scholars use the principles of the legal fi eld they 
have reconstructed or they use pragmatic arguments, such as that the existing 
rules no longer answer practical concerns. Suggestions for law reform often in-
volve taking a particular legal principle to its logical conclusion. Many European 
countries have opened the institution of marriage to homosexual couples on the 
basis of arguments of sexual equality and non-discrimination. After a number of 
reforms in family law based on equality, such as equalising the positions of men 
and women in marriage and abolishing distinctions between legitimate and il-
legitimate children, treating heterosexual and homosexual relationships as equal 
was argued to be, and adopted as, a logical next step.8 The goal of law reform 
research is practical: namely, to infl uence legal decision-makers and thereby to 
improve the legal system and its administration. That practical goal brings us to 
the second typical feature of doctrinal research.
The second typical feature is its symbiosis with legal practice. At the begin-
ning of this section, I described the institutional side of the close connection 
between scholarship and practice. Here, my point is a different one: the content 
of doctrinal research is both infl uenced by and has an infl uence on legal prac-
tice. The infl uence of legal practice on doctrinal research is most obvious in the 
stage of problem setting: the research problems of doctrinal research are shaped 
by the problems encountered in the practice of law. This can be quite literally 
the case, when scholars take up a problem raised by the legislature or profes-
sional organisations. However, it is also true in a more general sense. As Murphy 
6 A well-known example is the call for the abolition of criminal law, made for instance by 
the Dutch criminal law scholar Hulsman.
7 What this implies for the perspective of legal research is the topic of the next section.
8 See Lahey/Anderson 2004, 35–45. On this topic, it is interesting to read Supreme Court 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence v. Texas 539 U. S.  558 (2003); he used a similar argument 
with opposite intentions – namely, as a slippery slope argument against the majority decision 
that invalidated a discriminatory statute. Once homosexual relationships are treated equally 
in one instance (consensual sex in this case) that will lead to homosexuals being allowed to 
marry, so do not embark on this path. Of course, the equality argument is only this radical if 
there is no good reason to make a distinction, and what counts as such a reason depends 
mostly on the particular legal culture.
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and Roberts point out, legal research is research a posteriori, after the fact of new 
legal texts being created.9 It is the work of the legislature and the judiciary that 
creates the material for legal researchers to work with and, as a consequence, 
also the problems that their research tackles. This has the peculiar effect that 
research results can be made obsolete by a new statute or a new judgment: that 
is, the value of a recommendation to change the law in a certain way is reduced 
to zero once the legislature makes a policy choice in the form of a statute on the 
issue. Similarly, descriptive work loses its relevance once the law changes. In 
other fi elds of scholarship, such infl uence exerted by the fi eld of research is rare. 
It happens regularly that the research of one scholar is made superfl uous because 
another scholar publishes results on the same issue earlier, but in that case it is 
the competition within the community of researchers that makes the results 
obsolete, not the practice studied.
Doctrinal research also exerts an infl uence on the professional practice of law. 
The results of doctrinal research are absorbed by legal practice, so that the re-
search in effect shapes the practice it is describing. An innovation of legal doc-
trine that is recognised as a useful improvement becomes part of new legislation 
or of a change in case law. Of course, this is the point, as relevance to legal prac-
tice is a central criterion for the value of the research. As I described in relation 
to law reform, the goals of doctrinal research include the improvement of the 
body of legal rules and their interpretation and application. The line between 
scholarship and practice is close to disappearing when scholars take it upon 
themselves to draft new legislation. There are plenty of examples: for instance, 
legal theorist Karl N.  Llewellyn participated in the drafting of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in the United States.10 The UCC was not itself a statute but 
a recommendation for harmonisation of commercial law, but has been turned 
into statutory law in some form in all 50 states of the US.  In the Dutch civil 
code, one can recognise the doctrinal views of E. M. Meijers, who designed its 
structure and was its fi rst draftsman.11 In such cases, scholars become practition-
ers themselves, merging the academic and the professional perspective.
After this characterisation of doctrinal research as the traditional form of legal 
research, the outline of legal research now needs to be complicated. Over the 
last forty years, starting in the United States, the scope of legal research has ex-
panded to include interdisciplinary approaches. Because it was discussed in 
Chapter 1, I will not go into the nature of interdisciplinary research as such, but 
I will discuss the implications of interdisciplinary research for the links with the 
9 Murphy/Roberts 1987, 678.
10 Maggs 2000.
11 Meijers made his fi rst drafts between 1947 and 1954; the new code was not adopted 
until 1992 (see Hartkamp 2002, 1–2).
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professional practice of law. Generally, interdisciplinarity in legal research makes 
it less oriented towards legal practice.12 The move away from practice can also 
be attributed to a trend towards specialisation, both in the academic world and 
in the professions.13
It is hard to tell which of the trends, specialisation or interdisciplinarity, 
comes fi rst, because they emerged at the same time. Professional specialisation 
is most remarkable in law fi rms, as most professional lawyers no longer cover all 
legal fi elds; they specialise in one legal fi eld such as criminal law or commercial 
law, and more often even in a smaller fi eld, like mergers and acquisitions. Simi-
larly, academic specialisation forces scholars to restrict themselves to one par-
ticular fi eld of law, either administrative or international environmental. One of 
the reasons for specialisation in the legal academic world is the orientation to-
wards the model of scholarship of the sciences: namely, being focused on publi-
cation in peer-reviewed journals,14 viewing citation as a measure of success, 
and, in general, seeing the scholarly community as the audience for one’s writ-
ing.15 A scholar’s standing in the community depends on recognition of his 
expertise, to which specialisation contributes, as the focus on one topic or sub-
fi eld the accumulation of knowledge.
At the same time, there is a move towards interdisciplinarity. At fi rst glance, 
this may seem contrary to specialisation, because interdisciplinarity involves the 
mastery of two different disciplines, which considerably broadens the fi eld of 
study. However, once an interdisciplinary topic becomes entrenched as a recog-
nisable fi eld, those engaging in it identify with it as their specialisation: for in-
stance, the fi eld of law and economics has become institutionalised with its own 
journals, professorships, and research centres. As described in the fi rst chapter, 
interdisciplinarity often leads to the formation of a subdiscipline, like legal his-
tory and sociology of law, which are also areas of specialisation. One might say 
that specialisation without interdisciplinarity is easier to achieve than interdis-
ciplinarity without specialisation. Although a scholar can easily narrow his fo-
cus to a particular fi eld of law while still doing purely doctrinal legal research, 
it is very diffi cult to undertake high-level research in an interdisciplinary fi eld 
while retaining a broad focus on law. Mastering two disciplines broadly is cur-
rently next to impossible in the academic world.
These two trends of interdisplinarity and specialisation move the academic 
scholar away from professional practice, because it becomes increasingly diffi -
12 Luban 2001, 169.
13 Posner 2002, 1318.
14 Peer-reviewed journals only publish articles after they have been reviewed anonymous-
ly by one or more other scholars.
15 Posner 2002, 1320.
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cult for anyone not familiar with the fi eld in question to follow what goes on 
there. Many interdisciplinary specialisations require knowledge of the two dis-
ciplines and of the particular concepts and terminology of the specialisation. 
This is only feasible for those that do work in the same area of specialisation. As 
Posner points out, such specialisation carries the risk of communities of scholars 
becoming closed off from the rest of the academic world and from practical 
life.16 This of course does not mean that these risks necessarily materialise, as 
there are always scholars who specialise but manage to remain connected to a 
broader circle of scholars or practitioners.
However, these trends do not signal the end of doctrinal research. Its biggest 
asset is that it can demonstrate its practical relevance through its connection 
with the professional practice of law. Becoming specialised in one area of aca-
demic legal scholarship only diminishes a scholar’s relevance to practice when 
scholars no longer communicate their fi ndings to professionals. In addition, it is 
clear that doctrinal research can incorporate some aspects of interdisciplinarity 
without aiming at a complete integration of disciplines, as we have shown in 
Chapter 1. In this way, doctrinal research can use insights from other disciplines 
to innovate without giving up its particular character.
3. Second characteristic: An internal perspective
The close relationship between scholarship and practice has one particularly 
profound consequence for the nature of legal scholarship: its perspective is in-
ternal to the practice of law. Using an internal perspective means that scholars 
regard the subject matter of their research from the same point of view as the 
people who engage in the subject. An internal perspective on law means sharing 
the perspective of judges, lawyers, legislators, or citizens who engage in legal 
practice.17 Of course, a more particular characterisation of the perspective of 
scholars specifi es which group of those practising the law is taken as the point of 
reference; I will return to this issue shortly. First, it is important to explain the 
differences between an internal and an external perspective.
I use the idea of a ‘practice’ here in a broadened sense, compared to the pro-
fessional practice of law that was the focus of the previous paragraph. A profes-
sional practice is defi ned by the professionals who work in law, which includes 
attorneys, judges, and legislators; all these lawyers form a similarly educated 
16 Posner 2002, 1325.
17 There is some debate about who should be included in the internal perspective: only 
legal professionals or citizens as well. The answer depends on the conception of law that is 
adopted; here, I use the broadest characterisation.
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professional group that we call legal practitioners. The theoretical idea of a prac-
tice does not depend on professional participants, although in the fi eld of law 
most participants are professionals. A practice in this broader sense is a complex 
cooperative social activity governed by a particular set of values and norms.18 
Law is just such a practice, and so is morality, medicine, or politics. The idea of 
an internal or external perspective on law thus means internal or external to the 
social practice of law.
Traditionally, the distinction between internal and external perspectives is 
used to distinguish between legal scholarship and a social science of law.19 Social 
scientists are supposed to regard law as a practice to be described from the out-
side; as an observer of behaviour, a social scientist aims to explain the behav-
ioural patterns he has observed. Such social scientists use their own concepts and 
methodologies without relating these to the self-understanding of the people 
studied. Thus, a social scientist may study legal confl ict resolution with a socio-
logical set of concepts to defi ne confl ict and its resolution in terms of people’s 
behaviour. By contrast, the internal perspective of legal scholarship will use the 
legal defi nition of confl ict in terms of the kinds of claims recognised by law, and 
its resolution in terms of the goals and values of the legal fi eld. It will be appar-
ent that the distinction between an external and an internal perspective parallels 
the distinction between Erklären (Explaining) and Verstehen (Understanding) 
discussed in Chapter 1. For the purposes of this book, the external-internal 
distinction is important to clarify how a legal scholar can understand his own 
position in relation to the practice of law. In the discussions about the distinc-
tion, external-internal distinction is interpreted in a variety of ways, which I 
will touch upon but not examine in depth.20
However, the distinction as just drawn marks the extremes of a more nuanced 
range of perspectives. The precise meaning of the internal-external distinction 
has been debated extensively, both in socio-legal studies and in legal philosophy, 
leading to a more refi ned middle ground. In legal philosophy, the distinction 
between the external and the internal perspective is used by H. L. A. Hart to 
distinguish the position of the observer of the legal system from that of the par-
ticipant who follows the legal system’s rules. Confusingly, for Hart, the external 
point of view is both that of the observer and that of people who do not accept 
the rules but merely obey them because they fear punishment.21 This means that 
18 See Taekema 2003, 173–177 for an explanation of the idea of a practice. See also Tama-
naha 1997, 167–175.
19 Tamanaha 1997, 156.
20 Tamanaha 2006 is an attempt to clarify the different meanings and dimensions of the 
external-internal distinction.
21 Hart 1994, 89.
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in legal philosophy we have to distinguish two meanings with regard to the 
distinction between the internal and external perspectives. In the fi rst, we see 
two ways in which people relate to legal rules. In the second, however, the two 
perspectives are used to distinguish theories of law – those that describe law 
from the outside, such as Hart’s legal positivism, and those that identify with the 
internal viewpoint of the judge, such as Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivism.22 
Legal positivism’s external perspective is moderately external, because it takes 
into account that there are people who take the internal perspective.
In socio-legal studies, criticism of behaviouristic research from the extremely 
external perspective has led to the development of viewpoints that are not easily 
described as either external or internal.23 Behavourism is only concerned with 
regularities of behaviour, observed from the outside, and with the causes of that 
behaviour.24 The criticism is that behaviourism, by ignoring the reasons people 
give for their actions, gives fl awed explanations of these actions. People do not 
behave as causally determined machines but as reason-giving persons. In the 
context of law, this means people cite rules and values as reasons for their actions: 
namely, normative reasons that remain invisible in a behaviouristic research set-
ting. Including these normative aspects of the practice, however, does not mean 
that the research perspective becomes a completely internal one; the basic out-
look is still observation, but observation is taken to include fi nding out what 
normative propositions people subscribe to without subscribing to these norms 
oneself. By contrast, the internal perspective means that the researcher engages 
in the practice as a participant, giving similar reasons and subscribing to the same 
values. The researcher takes part in the practice and refl ects upon it in the same 
terms as the other participants. This does not mean that he needs to accept the 
practice uncritically, but it does mean that he needs to explain his criticisms in 
terms that the participants of the practice understand.25 Taking the position of 
the researcher as the key factor means that these less extreme views are also mod-
erately external: that is, the researcher is an observer, not a participant.
Both in the socio-legal and the jurisprudential context, the external/internal 
distinction can be taken to refl ect the aim of the research: namely, that an exter-
nal perspective fi ts descriptive research while an internal perspective fi ts norma-
tive research. Although this is basically correct, again the differences are more 
nuanced. From the external point of view, it is also possible to make normative 
22 Dworkin 1986, 14.
23 The term ‘moderately external’ is used primarily in the jurisprudential debate (compare 
Hart’s discussion above). In the socio-legal debate, the basic distinction between external and 
internal concerns how to approach the observed practice.
24 And is thus an extreme form of positivism in the terms of Chapter 3.
25 An example is the legal sociology of Philip Selznick (e.g. Selznick 1961).
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claims about the practice studied, but the normative reasons for these claims are 
then not taken from the practice itself. In Hart’s legal positivism, standards of 
criticism are taken from morality, not from law. The descriptive and the norma-
tive parts of research are kept separate, and description is seen as the main task of 
the research. From the internal point of view, descriptive work and normative 
claims are made on the basis of the same practice; they can be distinguished but 
not separated. In Dworkin’s interpretivism, the standards of criticism derive 
from the political morality that is part of the legal practice.26 A correct descrip-
tion of the practice involves a determination of its normative consequences. A 
judge makes a normative judgment on the basis of the best description of the 
norms of the positive law. A legal scholar using an internal perspective engages 
in a debate with the other participants in the practice, and criticises the practice 
in terms of standards that are acceptable to other participants.
It is clear that legal researchers usually take the internal perspective, justifying 
and criticising research in terms of the internal standards of the legal practice. 
As I demonstrated in my description of doctrinal research in Section 2, the 
standards commonly used to judge legal research results are the substantive prin-
ciples of the legal system and its underlying values such as coherence, legal cer-
tainty, and the rule of law. The internal perspective is described as a participant’s 
view of the practice of law. However, we can distinguish a number of different 
types of participants: lawyers, judges, legislators, and citizens. All of their per-
spectives differ slightly. Which internal perspective is taken up by legal scholar-
ship? More particularly, which professional perspective do legal scholars iden-
tify with, or can we perhaps distinguish a distinct scholar’s perspective?
Most commonly, legal scholars take the perspective of a judge by focusing on 
the consequences of research results for decisions in specifi c cases. In the per-
spective of the judge, the constraints of the legal system in which he works are 
squarely in place; a judge cannot question the system as a whole, because his role 
commits him to upholding that system.27 So we can see that the use of the in-
ternal principles and values of the legal system as the standards for legal research 
follow from the judge’s perspective. Although the judge’s perspective is the most 
common one for legal researchers, there is a degree of pluralism in perspectives. 
The second important perspective for legal research is that of the legislature. We 
encountered the legislature’s perspective when we discussed law reform in the 
previous paragraph: proposals for legal change involve taking the point of view 
of the decision-maker who has the power to change the law. Of course, this is 
26 Dworkin 1986, 255–256.
27 This is, of course, a very general statement. Judges can very well be critical of elements 
of the legal system, or can use the system instrumentally. In their decisions, however, they 
cannot reject the legal system as a whole.
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not only the legislature; depending on the legal system, legal change is to a 
greater or lesser extent a co-production of legislators and judges. What these 
perspectives – which can be expanded to include other institutions that have 
law-making powers, such as the executive branch of government – have in 
common is that they are the perspectives of a decision-maker. One of the key 
elements of the internal legal perspective is that participants have to decide, 
whether on a new law or rule, or on a case, and that these decisions have practi-
cal consequences. Taking the internal perspective involves acknowledgement 
both of the need to decide and of the importance of a decision.
Thus far, I have taken professional perspectives as the model for legal scholar-
ship. However, legal scholars do not always identify completely with the deci-
sion-making perspective of a judge or legislator. We can also distinguish a more 
detached point of view, in which the legal researcher gives advice to the deci-
sion-makers without necessarily taking a stand on the decision itself. The legal 
researcher may offer considerations to the decision-makers to take into account 
without an opinion about the right decision. Such a perspective is still an internal 
one, because it is framed by the same constraints as that of the decision-maker. 
The advisory role entails presenting research results in such a way that they can 
be used by decision-makers. In order to do that, the perspective of the primary 
decision-makers always needs to be taken into account. We can recognise this 
perspective in the approach of the handbook, which points out the disputed ar-
eas of doctrine and formulates possible directions to resolve theses disputes.
Taking this fi rst step to distance legal researchers from the practical decision-
maker raises more diffi cult questions about the perspective of legal scholars; for 
instance, is it possible for a legal scholar to take an external perspective while 
still working within the discipline of law? Or to phrase it differently, does en-
gaging in legal research necessarily entail the taking of an internal perspective? 
This brings us to the contested boundaries of the discipline. In the narrow view 
of the discipline, only doctrinal research with its internal perspective and the 
accompanying legal theory that studies the presuppositions of the doctrinal re-
search counts as legal research. Others engaging in research concerning law do 
not fall into the same category; they do philosophy, or history, or sociology, not 
law. In the broad view, however, these other types of research are indeed legal: 
they are legal philosophy, legal history, and legal sociology as sub-disciplines of 
law, distinct from philosophy, history, or sociology in general. In the second 
part of this book, it is shown that the debate is still going on in each of these 
disciplines and inter-disciplines. There is no easy answer to this question, other 
than saying that the majority of legal research is done from the internal perspec-
tive, and that it depends on one’s defi nition of the discipline of law as to wheth-
er legal research is restricted to that internal perspective.
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Here I want to pursue a slightly different question; given the internal per-
spective of doctrinal legal research, how does that type relate to research from 
an external perspective? The reason for posing this question is the continuous 
challenging of the legal perspective from the outside, especially from the per-
spective of social sciences and economics. A frequent criticism of legal research 
is that its results are less scientifi c and not as well supported as the results of 
other disciplines studying the fi eld of law. Sometimes this takes the form of a 
criticism of specifi c legal practices. For example, legal psychologists claim that 
lawyers’ standards for evidence in court cases are too relaxed.28 At other times 
it takes the form of rejecting basic assumptions of legal scholarship. For instance, 
legal economists claim that lawyers work on the basis of the wrong framework 
of values, and they should subordinate standards of fairness to the standard of 
welfare.29 Legal sociologists claim that offi cial legal norms often do not have the 
expected effects.30 The gist of such criticism is usually that legal scholars need 
to accept the insights of these empirical studies.31
How should legal researchers who work within the legal perspective respond 
to these challenges? To my mind, it would be a mistake to give up the specifi -
cally legal perspective and simply surrender to these outside views. However, 
this does not mean that nothing should be done with their results. Parallel to the 
moderately external point of view of legal sociology, we can construct what I 
would call a moderately internal point of view.32 By this I mean that the knowl-
edge generated by other disciplines needs to be incorporated into research by 
lawyers without giving up the specifi cally legal point of view. This entails main-
taining a clear focus on the aims of one’s own legal research, but acknowledging 
that knowledge from other disciplines is often essential to do fruitful research in 
law. For example, a legal scholar doing research on a reform of the law of evi-
dence in civil procedure cannot ignore psychological research on the dubious 
quality of human memory, and needs to incorporate these results in the assess-
ment of witness testimony. However, this can still be done by maintaining an 
internal point of view in which the legal values of procedural law remain the 
central standard of assessment. For many legal scholars, the interdisciplinary 
challenge will cause them to conclude that the internal point of view can no 
longer be maintained in isolation. For some, it means that they become more 
28 Wagenaar/Van Koppen/Crombag 1993.
29 Kaplow/Shavell 2002.
30 Classic studies are Moore 1973; Aubert 1967; Macaulay 1963.
31 Compare the discussion of the danger of subordination to a different discipline at the 
end of Chapter 1, Section 2.
32 The term ‘moderately internal’ is not common, although the claims I make for it are not 
new. Compare Dworkin 1986, 13–14, and Wintgens 2005, 20–21.
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aware of the specifi c internal perspective of their legal research without con-
cluding that they must do interdisciplinary work themselves. Just as external 
views of law need to consider the reasons given by participants in legal practice, 
internal views of law must take into account outside empirical studies.
4. Third characteristic: The method of the humanities
Historically, the study of law has always been at the core of the university. The 
earliest subjects taught at the university were law, theology, medicine, and the 
arts.33 These had much in common methodologically, as the study of primarily 
ancient texts was central to each. In a sense, the discipline of law has never left 
the methods of the mediaeval university behind. Central to the way a legal 
scholar operates is the study of authoritative texts as a hermeneutical and argu-
mentative enterprise. In order to understand what legal scholars do methodo-
logically, it is therefore more fruitful to look to the humanities than to the social 
sciences. The central method of the humanities is hermeneutics, which is also 
the methodological basis for legal scholarship. However, hermeneutics, both 
generally as the method of the humanities and more specifi cally as legal herme-
neutics, is not easily described.
The central feature of hermeneutics in general is that it was developed as a 
method for interpreting texts. How do you uncover the meaning of, for in-
stance, a Biblical text? Within law, the classical hermeneutical question is how to 
determine the meaning of a statutory rule or a court ruling. Over time, the focus 
on texts has been broadened to include human actions and other forms of human 
expression, and the idea of a method to approach texts has been broadened to a 
philosophy of interpretation.34 All human action has meaning and is therefore 
subject to hermeneutical interpretation. Describing hermeneutics as a method is 
therefore to be understood broadly. For this reason, hermeneutics is also closely 
related to those social sciences that aim at understanding what people do. In legal 
research, the textual basis of hermeneutics is still highly relevant, because almost 
all of the materials legal scholars work with are text-based. Although legal cases 
arise out of the confl icts of social practice, a legal scholar uses them in the form 
of textual sources. All standard sources for lawyers are texts.35
33 For an overview of the relationship between law and the medieval university, see Ber-
man 1983, 120–164.
34 The most important author in this regard is the philosopher Gadamer, who developed a 
general philosophical theory of hermeneutics (Gadamer 1990).
35 Because of this feature of legal research, I will focus the discussion of the hermeneutical 
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Legal hermeneutics as commonly understood is not primarily a method for 
scholarly research, but is the starting point for a method of interpretation in 
practical legal reasoning. A judge or lawyer also needs to interpret the texts of 
statutes and cases, for which he needs tools. Standard texts on legal method are 
therefore to a large extent texts about the interpretive tools for practical legal 
purposes.36 Again, we encounter the close connection between legal research 
and professional practice. What distinguishes legal hermeneutics from herme-
neutics in general is its practical orientation: understanding a text is not an end 
in itself; it is done for the purpose of using it properly in a case or a legal argu-
ment. In the previous section, we saw that legal scholars have a slightly different 
perspective from that of professional decision-makers such as judges, but there 
are important continuities methodologically. Some of these continuities are due 
to the fact that practical lawyers and legal scholars work with the same primary 
materials, and scholars are used to the same interpretive approach as practition-
ers. Most importantly, the continuities are due to the general features of the 
hermeneutical method, which even if they are not addressed in texts about legal 
method are still presupposed in the way legal scholars and lawyers work.37
What are the general features of the hermeneutical method? The method 
starts with the recognition that there are always at least three elements to be 
considered in interpretation: the text itself, the author of the text, and the reader 
of the text. All of these elements are potentially problematic. The need for inter-
pretation arises because the meaning of a text is not immediately clear to the 
reader. What modern hermeneutical theory makes clear is that clarifi cation is 
dependent on the relationship between the text and the reader. Every reader ap-
proaches a text with his own pre-existing judgments38, which are challenged in 
the confrontation with the text. These judgments are a given, but they are not 
immutable. The text you interpret adds something new to your existing horizon 
of judgments. Interpretation is therefore a circular process in which the reader 
creates new meaning and thereby also changes his own understanding.39
method on working with texts. To apply the method more broadly, modifi cations of the 
central features are needed, although the general line of argument remains the same.
36 For example McLeod 2007; Larenz/Canaris 1995.
37 The most extensive treatments of legal method as a hermeneutical enterprise can be 
found in German scholarship (e.g. Larenz/Canaris 1995). The most relevant Dutch text is 
Scholten 1974. Most English language texts about legal methods do not explicitly address the 
idea of hermeneutics.
38 Sometimes the term ‘prejudice’ is used here, and should be read as a neutral term mean-
ing one’s existing beliefs and opinions, which are not necessarily negative. In German, the 
word ‘Vorverständnis’ is often used (Esser 1972), which could be described as pre-existing 
understanding.
39 An accessible sketch of philosophical hermeneutics in connection to law is Mootz 1988.
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The most common starting point for resolving unclarity of meaning is to look 
at the author’s intention. However, reference to the intention of the author of 
the text is not always decisive. Moreover, often the only access to the author’s 
intention is by way of the text itself. In law, the most commonly discussed prob-
lem in this respect is the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision. A 
statute is adopted by a legislature consisting of the members of parliament, 
sometimes proposed by members of the government. Who is the author of such 
a statute, and what is the common intention of these people? And even if we can 
reconstruct the common intention of the historical legislature, what is the rel-
evance of that intention for the problem of interpreting the statute today, pos-
sibly a hundred years later?
The problematic nature of the author of a text has led hermeneutics to turn 
to other leads for interpretation. Most importantly, there is the insight that no 
text exists in isolation, and that the meaning of a text depends on its context, the 
way it relates to a tradition of other texts. Textual interpretation therefore also 
involves reading a text in the light of a larger whole. In law, we do this con-
tinually when we interpret specifi c legal rules in the light of a whole statute, or 
of the line of case law, or of the doctrine of the fi eld of law. This entails that we 
try to achieve coherence in interpretation, as the best one is that which fi ts op-
timally within the larger whole.
However, the larger whole of which the text is part also does not usually 
generate an uncontroversial conclusion. There are often many contradictory 
lines of argument to be found in one body of work. The method of herme-
neutics does not have a solution for this problem. It is more correct to say that 
hermeneutical theory has insistently brought the problem to our attention. The 
possibility of more than one correct interpretation and the lack of an uncontro-
versial answer do point to an important characteristic of legal scholarship: it is 
necessarily argumentative.
The most important consequence of the argumentative character of legal 
scholarship is that there is no fi nal closure to any scholarly dispute; in other 
words, there are more or less convincing arguments but no incontrovertible 
proof that a certain argument is correct. This entails that the standard for judg-
ing the quality of an argument is intersubjective: for instance, is the reasoning 
acceptable to the larger community of scholars? This is a characteristic of the 
humanities in general, and it is particularly noticeable in law. Disputes about 
key principles and concepts are found in all legal cultures. What is the meaning 
of human dignity? What is the correct legal conception of causality? What is the 
ultimate goal served by the punishment of crimes? Disputes about more spe-
cifi c issues often involve such fundamental questions. Should compensation for 
wrongful birth be awarded to a healthy child that was unwanted, or is this con-
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trary to human dignity? The answer depends on the appreciation of fundamen-
tal moral principles – and a theory of the human person – that remain contro-
versial. The best we can achieve is to make our arguments as explicit and sophis-
ticated as possible, which includes making clear the theoretical underpinnings 
of the arguments. Although there is no standard methodology for doing this, 
good starting points can be found in the interpretive approach of Ronald Dwor-
kin and the refl ective equilibrium method of John Rawls.40
One of the reasons legal argument is often seen as unsatisfactory by non-law-
yers is its reliance on authority. In doctrinal research, there are very good rea-
sons to rely on the authority of primary sources, because coherence with the 
authoritative sources of legislation and precedent is an important aim. However, 
the practice of relying on the authority of other legal scholars is less self-evident. 
Why should anyone accept an argument because it can be found in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries? Reference to scholarly authorities is acceptable if the opinion is 
shared by a great number of scholars; in that case, it is not an argument from 
authority per se but an indicator of consensus. It is also acceptable if the opinion 
is supported by good arguments; again, it is not the authority itself that is con-
vincing but an additional reason, the quality of the argument. Criticism of legal 
methods can therefore in part be countered if authority arguments are used 
more sparingly.
Is that enough? Especially because of the confrontation with other disciplines 
and their methodologies, there is a widespread discussion on the quality of legal 
research methodology. Does our traditional hermeneutical method suffi ce to 
make our research results as good as those of social sciences like economics or 
psychology, which seem much surer of their methodologies? Compared to the 
social sciences, legal methodology seems imprecise and underdeveloped. This 
has led some to turn to the social sciences as a model for legal methodology.4142 
Empirical social science research seems to be based on a much clearer sense of 
research design and the appropriate methodology than does legal research. To 
some extent this is true. In most of the social sciences, there are standard ways 
of setting up and conducting research in which every student of, say, psychology 
or political science is trained. However, the similarities in research method are 
40 Dworkin works with two dimensions: one of fi t and one of justifi cation (Dworkin 1986, 
230–31). Refl ective equilibrium aims at making particular judgments, principles, and theo-
ries coherent with each other. Good introductions to refl ective equilibrium are Daniels 1996 
and Van der Burg/Van Willigenburg 1998.
41 For example McConville/Chui 2007.
42 In the Netherlands, a debate on legal methodology has been raging on the pages of the 
general legal journal, Nederlands Juristenblad. The discussion started in 2003 with an article 
by the Dean of Leiden Law School (Stolker 2003). Many of the contributors turn to social 
science methodology for guidance on how to improve Dutch legal methods.
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largely superfi cial: they concern the formulation of a central research question 
or hypothesis, references to existing literature, and explaining the set-up of the 
research. There is much less consensus about the research goals and the value of 
specifi c research methodologies. This is not the place to debate method in the 
social sciences, but it is important to note that the methodological pluralism of 
the social sciences makes it impossible to hold up a standard social science meth-
odology as the model for legal methodology. Moreover, the more basic question 
is whether the general methodological outlook of the empirical social sciences 
fi ts legal scholarship better than the hermeneutical approach. One strong argu-
ment to the contrary is the frequent adoption of a hermeneutical approach with-
in the social sciences.43
I want to focus on a basic issue that is problematic in this regard: the notions 
with regard to data and theory that are current in empirical research. Much of 
the research design in social sciences is premised on the idea that the researcher 
himself will be engaged in the gathering of data. Research methods are then 
methods of collecting and processing data. In empirical social sciences, data in 
the research design form a component that is different from theories. Theoreti-
cal input is necessary for the formulation of the research question, while data 
comprise the information needed to answer the question. In legal research, it is 
diffi cult to think of the research material in terms of data, especially when con-
trasted with theories; there is no strict separation between data, as the informa-
tion to work with, and theory. What is the difference between an opinion of a 
court about wrongful birth and that of a legal scholar? Both can be viewed as 
contributions to a debate about a diffi cult legal question. Both primary sources, 
such as legislation and case law, and scholarly literature are sources of argu-
ments, not merely sources of information. A legal scholar can use case law as a 
source of information about the way a legal question is commonly answered in 
a legal system, but also as a source for different kinds of arguments about that 
question. Only in the fi rst case does a distinction between data and theory make 
sense. The argumentative character of legal scholarship is therefore the most 
signifi cant reason not to apply an empirical social science method. An empirical 
method does not help one to understand the arguments made in legal texts. In 
many ways, legal scholarship is more like an art than a science. It seems more 
profi table to increase one’s awareness of the possibilities and drawbacks of the 
method we already use -hermeneutics – than to turn to a different method that 
does not fi t our scholarly categories and practices.
43 Discussed under the heading of interpretivism in Chapter 3.
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5. Characterising legal scholarship in relation to law: Relative autonomy
In the description of legal scholarship in the previous sections, we encountered 
a number of relationships with the domain of law as a social practice. In this 
fi nal section, I want to draw some conclusions about the nature of legal scholar-
ship from the distinctive characteristics of the practice of law. I think we can 
best sum up the character of law as being relatively autonomous. Law is autono-
mous in the sense that it has its specifi c orientation on a system of rules and 
principles, specifi c core values, and its own language and institutions. Because 
of these distinct characteristics, we can point to law as a separate domain in 
society. However, law is also closely connected to other social practices, not 
only because it regulates activities in all kinds of other practices but also because 
law’s values and principles always refer to the values of other practices.44
The relative autonomy of the practical domain of law has important conse-
quences for the enterprise of legal scholarship. If we want to gain a meaningful 
understanding of what law is, we need to take the connections between law and 
other social practices into account in our research. Of course, it is possible to 
bracket these connections in order to keep one’s individual research managea-
ble, but in most cases the interesting research questions do require paying atten-
tion to the intertwinement with other domains.
This leads to the fi rst sense in which legal scholarship itself is relatively au-
tonomous: it depends on input from other disciplines, both empirically, in order 
to get straight the facts that law deals with, and theoretically, in order to fully 
understand both the normative principles and the theories and concepts of law 
that are connected to values and theories related to other practices. Good legal 
research at least makes some use of insights from other disciplines.45
The second sense in which legal scholarship is relatively autonomous is in 
relation to the practice of law. Accepting that the perspective of legal scholarship 
is internal to that of the practice of law means that the relevance of legal scholar-
ship is always measured to some extent by the contribution it makes to the 
purposes of law in a practical sense. This by no means implies that legal scholar-
ship should be uncritical of practice; on the contrary, well-argued criticism is 
one of the most valuable contributions legal scholarship can make to practical 
concerns. However, it does mean that legal scholarship needs to present its argu-
ments in a way that they can be understood, and responded to, by participants 
in the legal practice.
44 Taekema 2003, 189–191.
45 I will not repeat here the arguments about the different kinds of interdisciplinarity; see 
Chapter 1, section 2.
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Because both the relationships with other disciplines and with legal practice 
can be characterised as relatively autonomous, there is a wide range of positions 
on legal scholarship to choose from. A legal scholar can concentrate on doctri-
nal research with a strong focus on legal practice, emphasising the autonomy 
from other disciplines and the openness towards practice. A legal scholar can 
also focus on purely academic work in which interdisciplinary themes are 
prominent, open to other disciplines but not primarily aimed at informing prac-
tice. All such positions are defensible as long as one is aware of the choices one 
makes.
Good legal scholarship requires awareness of one’s limitations as a legal re-
searcher coupled with the willingness to try to overcome them when necessary. 
An open mind towards everything that may be relevant to one’s own research 
is the fi rst step.
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